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For thirty-three years, various administrations have wrestled with 
and, to a great extent, have avoided a fundamental issue ad-
dressed in the Clean Air Act, that is, at what point plants built be-
fore 1970 must comply with new air pollution standards.1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 As one of the first major pieces of legislation enacted to address 
the country’s environmental resources, one might expect that all the 
wrinkles of the Clean Air Act (CAA) would be ironed out thirty-five 
years after its passing; however, the CAA continues to be perhaps 
the most confounding and complex environmental legislation ever 
drafted.2 From the electricity that powers our light bulbs to the pulp 
mill that generates the materials used to create the paper on which 
this Note appears, it is difficult, if not impossible, to think of a proc-
ess or item that the CAA has not impacted in some manner. 
 When enacting the CAA Amendments of 1970, Congress assigned 
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to administer and en-
force this substantial piece of legislation.3 Accordingly, throughout 
the thirty-five-year history of the CAA, the EPA’s authority to prom-
ulgate regulations as well as its interpretation and enforcement of 
these regulations has been under nearly constant attack. At the cen-
ter of these attacks arguably lies the EPA’s most difficult task: bal-
ancing the positive human and ecological health effects of pollution 
abatement with the potentially high expense of installing the neces-
sary technology.4 
 Perhaps no finer example of this balancing act exists than the de-
termination of when to require electric utilities operating prior to the 
1970 legislation to install state-of-the-art pollution-control equip-
ment. According to the CAA, these facilities must install the best 
available control technology when the operator undertakes a major 
                                                                                                                      
 1. United States v. Ohio Edison Co., 276 F. Supp. 2d 829, 832 (S.D. Ohio 2003). 
 2. THE CLEAN AIR ACT HANDBOOK, at xix (Robert J. Martineau, Jr. & David P. 
Novello eds., 2d ed. 2004) [hereinafter CAA HANDBOOK]. Although Congress enacted the 
original CAA in 1963, the CAA Amendments of 1970, 1977, and 1990 form the CAA as it is 
known today. The CAA is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7401 et seq. Originally enacted as Pub. L. 
No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392, the CAA has been amended by five major pieces of legislation: the 
Motor Vehicle Air Pollution Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-272, 79 Stat. 992; the Air Quality 
Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-148, 81 Stat. 485; the CAA Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 
91-604, 84 Stat. 1676; the CAA Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 9-95, 91 Stat. 685; and 
the CAA Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 10-549, 108 Stat. 2399. 
 3. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (2000); Michael R. Barr, Introduction to the Clean 
Air Act: History, Perspective, and Direction for the Future, in CAA HANDBOOK, supra note 
2, at 4-7. 
 4. For a discussion of the balancing act between energy production and the associ-
ated environmental concerns, see Stephanie Cohen, Energy Dreams and Energy Realities, 
5 NEW ATLANTIS: J. TECH. & SOC’Y 3 (2004), available at http://www.thenewatlantis.com/ 
archive/5/cohenprint.htm. 
2005]                          CLEARING THE AIR 261 
 
 
modification, or capital improvement, to the facility.5 However, an 
operating utility may be spared if such modifications merely amount 
to “routine” maintenance.6 EPA statements and judicial interpreta-
tions did little to clarify the distinction between capital improve-
ments and routine maintenance.7 Therefore, on October 27, 2003, the 
EPA promulgated a controversial rule (the Final Rule) containing the 
equipment replacement provision (ERP) to clarify the point at which 
routine maintenance ends and capital improvement begins.8 Specifi-
cally, the ERP exempts replacement of components with similar or 
identical components that amount to twenty percent or less of the 
process unit’s total value.9 However, the ERP faced stiff resistance 
and was subsequently challenged on its promulgation date in the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.10 Less than two 
months after its promulgation, the court granted a motion to stay the 
rule.11 
                                                                                                                      
 5. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(2) (2000). 
 6. 40 C.F.R. § 60.14(e)(1) (2004). 
 7. “It is clear to this Court that at various times since 1970 officials of the EPA have 
been remiss in . . . clarifying [the CAA’s] application to specific projects.” United States v. 
Ohio Edison Co., 276 F. Supp. 2d 829, 833 (S.D. Ohio 2003). However, the judicial system 
is not immune from such criticism. For example, Part III.A, infra, discusses the landmark 
case of Wisconsin Electric Power Co. v. Reilly (WEPCO), 893 F.2d 901 (7th Cir. 1990), and 
the major subsequent judicial interpretations of the applicable CAA provisions. In practice, 
these decisions do little to clarify the situation. 
 8. It should be noted from the outset that much of the controversy surrounding the 
Final Rule concerns the differences between the environmental policies of the Bush and 
Clinton Administrations. However, this Note does not intend to act as a forum for the poli-
tics behind the promulgation of the Final Rule. Certainly, the Final Rule, adopted by the 
Bush Administration, focuses upon energy policy considerations, rather than environ-
mental considerations. LARRY PARKER, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., CLEAN AIR AND 
NEW SOURCE REVIEW: DEFINING ROUTINE MAINTENANCE 4 (2004). Furthermore, obvious 
distinctions exist between the aggressive enforcement tactics of the Clinton Administration 
EPA and the energy-centric approach of the Bush Administration EPA. See Bruce Barcott, 
Changing All the Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2004, § 6 (Magazine), at 38, available at 2004 
WLNR 5394787. For more hostile discussions of the Bush Administration’s actions in re-
gard to the CAA, see Patrick Parenteau, Anything Industry Wants: Environmental Policy 
Under Bush II, 14 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 363 (2004) and Eric Schaeffer, Clearing the 
Air: Why I Quit Bush’s EPA, WASH. MONTHLY, July-Aug. 2002, at 20. 
 9. See Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) and Nonattainment New-Source 
Review (NSR): Equipment Replacement Provision of the Routine Maintenance, Repair and 
Replacement Exclusion, 68 Fed. Reg. 61,248, 61,270 (Dec. 31, 2002) (to be codified at 40 
C.F.R. pts. 51-52) [hereinafter Final Rule]. 
 10. New York v. EPA, No. 03-1380 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 24, 2003) (order staying the rule). 
The twelve states challenging the rule are Connecticut, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, 
New Hampshire, New Mexico, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Ver-
mont, and Wisconsin. The major cities challenging the rule included New York City, Wash-
ington, D.C., and San Francisco. Id.  
 11. Id. Subsequent to the issuance of the order, the EPA received multiple petitions 
for reconsideration of the Final Rule, and on July 1, 2004, it formally granted reconsidera-
tion and requested comments. 69 Fed. Reg. 40,278 (July 1, 2004). However, following a 
year-long reconsideration process, on June 6, 2005, the EPA announced that no changes 
were necessary to the Final Rule. 70 Fed. Reg. 33,838 (June 10, 2005). Accordingly, the 
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 When evaluating the Final Rule, the question must be asked, 
Does the ERP frustrate the congressional intent which forms the 
foundation of the CAA? This Note answers that question with a re-
sounding “yes.” Nevertheless, the judiciary is likely to grant defer-
ence to the EPA’s interpretation of the CAA. In Chevron U.S.A., Inc. 
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., the Supreme Court estab-
lished a two-part test, known as the Chevron “two-step,” to determine 
when Congress intended to grant interpretive authority to an admin-
istrative agency. Using that landmark decision and its progeny, this 
Note advances alternative justifications that a reviewing court could 
utilize to invalidate the ERP at step one and, as a result, avoid the 
substantial deference afforded to administrative interpretations at 
step two. 
 Part II of this Note provides a brief history of the CAA, including 
the statutory underpinnings of the New Source Performance Stan-
dards (NSPS) program, the New Source Review (NSR) program, the 
Modification Rule, and the Routine Maintenance, Repair, and Re-
placement (RMRR) exemption. Part III of this Note provides a review 
of the significant judicial interpretations of the Modification Rule 
and the RMRR exemption, including the Seventh Circuit’s influential 
decision in Wisconsin Electric Power Co. v. Reilly (WEPCO).12 Part IV 
examines the Final Rule. In particular, Part IV focuses upon the 
ERP’s potential effects on future installation of pollution-control 
technology and pending enforcement actions. Part V discusses the 
deference granted to an agency empowered to promulgate rules and 
regulations in order to administer a congressional delegation of au-
thority. Furthermore, Part V evaluates the Supreme Court’s retreat 
from traditional notions of Chevron deference and applies alternative 
rationales advanced in the Court’s decisions and the literature to the 
ERP dispute. Finally, Part VI summarizes and concludes this Note.  
II. BRIEF HISTORY OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT AND THE SALIENT 
PROVISIONS 
 Although Congress enacted the original CAA in 1963, that legisla-
tion bears little resemblance to the rigid and expansive structure un-
der which the United States operates today.13 The original CAA was 
intended to provide federal grants to state and local air pollution-
control agencies without encroaching upon individual states’ rights.14 
                                                                                                                      
underlying lawsuit may now proceed. EPA Sticks with New Source Review Rule Adopted in 
2003 on Equipment Replacement, Daily Env’t Rep. (BNA) No. 108, at A-1 (June 7, 2005). 
 12. 893 F.2d 901 (7th Cir. 1990). 
 13. BRUCE G. MILLER, COAL ENERGY SYSTEMS 126-27 (2005). 
 14. Id. Stated more emphatically during its inception, the primary purpose of the 
CAA was to “speed up, expand, and intensify the war against air pollution in the United 
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However, over the subsequent twenty-seven years, due to “dissatis-
faction with the progress of existing air pollution programs,”15 Con-
gress amended the Act on five occasions.16 These amendments effec-
tively expanded the scope of the CAA to become one of the country’s 
most complex and comprehensive pieces of environmental legisla-
tion.17 
A.  The CAA Amendments of 1970 
 Prior to the 1970 Amendments, individual states established 
emissions standards for stationary sources—a system which Con-
gress found inadequate.18 In particular, Congress believed that fed-
eral emissions standards were needed to preclude individual states 
from lowering standards to lure industry within their borders.19  
 Therefore, the CAA Amendments of 1970 established the expan-
sive primary purpose of the legislation: “to protect and enhance the 
quality of the Nation’s air resources so as to promote the public 
health and welfare and the productive capacity of its population.”20 In 
furtherance of this broad charge, these amendments required the 
EPA to establish maximum permissible concentrations, known as 
“national . . . ambient air quality standards” (NAAQS),21 for six “cri-
teria” pollutants.22 Additionally, the amendments characterized the 
nation’s air quality in one of two manners: those regions that com-
plied with NAAQS (attainment areas) and those regions that violated 
some or all NAAQS (nonattainment areas).23 Subsequent to the 
EPA’s identification of these six criteria pollutants and promulgation 
                                                                                                                      
States with a view to assuring that the air we breathe throughout the Nation is wholesome 
once again.” H.R. REP. NO. 91-1146, at 1 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5356, 5356. 
 15. Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 249 (1976).  
 16. For a discussion concerning the amendments of 1965, 1967, 1970, 1977, and 1990, 
see ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: LAW AND POLICY 326-29 
(4th ed. 2003). This Note only provides a cursory evaluation and summary of the applicable 
provisions contained in the 1970 and 1977 Amendments. 
 17. See Bernard F. Hawkins, Jr. & Mary Ellen Ternes, The New Source Review Pro-
gram: Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Nonattainment New Source Review, in 
CAA HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 131, 131-32. 
 18. As noted by Justice Marshall, Congress enacted the 1970 Amendments to the 
CAA to “take a stick to the States in order to guarantee the prompt attainment and main-
tenance of specified air quality standards.” Union Elec. Co., 427 U.S. at 249 (alterations in 
original) (citations omitted). 
 19. H.R. REP. NO. 91-1146, at 3 (1970), as reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5356, 5358. 
 20. 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1) (2000). 
 21. See id. § 7408(a)(1). 
 22. EPA promulgated NAAQS for the following six criteria pollutants: sulfur dioxide 
(SO2), particulate matter (PM), nitrogen oxide (NOX), carbon monoxide (CO), ozone (O3), 
and lead (Pb). National Primary and Secondary Ambient Air Quality Standards, 40 C.F.R. 
pt. 50 (2004). 
 23. Hawkins & Ternes, supra note 17, at 132. 
264  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:259 
 
 
of the NAAQS, the CAA required states to classify a region as an at-
tainment or nonattainment area.24   
 In addition, the 1970 CAA Amendments mandated that the EPA 
promulgate technology-based performance standards, known as 
NSPS, to regulate emissions from stationary pollution sources con-
structed post-1970.25 As opposed to NAAQS established under sec-
tions 108 through 110 of the CAA, NSPS are not based upon ambient 
air quality; rather, these technology-based standards concern par-
ticular industrial source categories.26 Therefore, the NSPS apply to 
new stationary sources regardless of the region’s attainment status.27 
This industry-wide standard sought to eliminate the economic ad-
vantages a state in compliance with NAAQS would hold over a state 
not in compliance with NAAQS, vis-à-vis attracting new industrial 
development.  
 However, according to congressional discussions held during con-
templation of the 1970 Amendments to the CAA, the NSPS program 
sought only to prevent future, that is, post-1970, degradation of our 
air resources. In other words, Congress avoided subjecting existing 
sources of air emissions to the costly installation of pollution-control 
technology. Instead, Congress believed that mandating updated pol-
lution-control technology when new sources of emissions were in the 
process of being constructed constituted the most effective and least 
expensive means of advancing the CAA’s goals.28 As such, facilities 
constructed prior to 1970 became subject to the NSPS if modifica-
tions to these sources created new or increased pollution emissions.29 
The NSPS program was clearly viewed as a means of eliminating 
“new pollution problems while cleaning up existing sources.”30 In or-
der to enforce the modification provision, the CAA required owners or 
operators of a facility subject to the NSPS program to provide written 
                                                                                                                      
 24. 42 U.S.C. § 7407(d)(1)-(7) (2000). Moreover, the CAA mandates that states develop 
state implementation plans (SIPs) to achieve NAAQS in nonattainment areas and main-
tain NAAQS in attainment areas. Id. § 7407(a). Although the EPA provides guidance for 
SIP development and ultimately rejects or approves individual SIPs, the states maintain 
the majority of authority under this system. Id. § 7407(d)(1)(B). 
 25. See id. § 7411(b). 
 26. Id. § 7411(b)(1)(A). 
 27. Robert J. Martineau, Jr. & Michael K. Stagg, New Source Performance Standards, 
in CAA HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 299, 299. 
 28. See S. REP. NO. 91-1196 (1970), reprinted in ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 
AGENCY, LEGAL COMPILATION: AIR STATUTES & LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, EXECUTIVE ORDERS, 
REGULATIONS, & GUIDELINES & REPORTS 15-16 (Jan. 1975). 
 29. Congress defined “modification” as “any physical change in, or change in the 
method of operation of, a stationary source which increases the amount of any air pollutant 
emitted by such source or which results in the emission of any air pollutant not previously 
emitted.” 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(4) (2000). 
 30. S. REP. NO. 91-1196, at 16 (1970), reprinted in 1 S. COMM. ON PUBLIC WORKS, A 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1970, at 416 (emphasis 
added). 
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notice to the EPA of physical alterations that may increase an appli-
cable emissions rate prior to commencement of the change.31 
 However, subsequent amendments to the CAA have reduced the 
significance of the NSPS program.32 Specifically, preconstruction 
permitting conducted on a case-by-case basis eliminated the need for 
industry-wide technology standards.33 Nonetheless, these permitting 
programs still refer to the NSPS program to establish the “floor” for 
technology implementation.34 
B.  The CAA Amendments of 1977 
 Due to the overly ambitious temporal goals of the 1970 Amend-
ments, Congress enacted the 1977 Amendments to provide a more 
realistic schedule for compliance with NAAQS.35 In addition, and 
more importantly for the purposes of this Note, the 1977 Amend-
ments established the New Source Review (NSR) program,36 which 
refers to a set of provisions designed to establish technological re-
quirements and permissible emissions levels for new sources of air 
pollution.37 The NSR permitting program encompasses three distinct 
concepts. First, the Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) 
program governs new emissions located within attainment areas.38 
Second, the Nonattainment New Source Review (NNSR) program 
governs, as the name would suggest, new emissions located within 
nonattainment areas.39 Finally, the third concept involves state-
regulated review of minor new emissions sources,40 generally with lit-
tle federal involvement.41  
 Notwithstanding the confusion surrounding the RMRR exemption 
and the NSR’s extensive application process, the basis of the NSR 
program is relatively simple in that it requires major stationary 
sources with a “potential to emit” a specific volume of a particular 
                                                                                                                      
 31. 40 C.F.R. § 60.7(a)(4) (2004); see also infra Part II.C. 
 32. See infra Part II.B. 
 33. Martineau & Stagg, supra note 27, at 300. 
 34. Id.; see, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7479(3) (2000) (establishing that best available control 
technology should be no less stringent than NSPS established in § 7411); id. § 7501(3) (es-
tablishing that the lowest achievable emission rates should be no less stringent than those 
permitted by the NSPS program). 
 35. Barr, supra note 3, at 6. 
 36. Hawkins & Ternes, supra note 17, at 131. 
 37. Generally, the Prevention of Significant Deterioration program and the Nonat-
tainment New Source Review program form what has become known as “New Source Re-
view.” Final Rule, supra note 9, at 61,249. 
 38. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7470-7492 (also referred to as Part C–Prevention of Significant Dete-
rioration of Air Quality).  
 39. Id. §§ 7501-7515 (also referred to as Part D–Plan Requirements for Nonattain-
ment Areas). 
 40. Id. § 7410(a)(2)(C) (requiring the state to include enforcement of emissions limita-
tions on “any stationary source[s],” not just major sources). 
 41. Hawkins & Ternes, supra note 17, at 131. 
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pollutant to obtain a construction and operating permit.42 As such, 
facilities proposing projects within attainment areas must submit to 
a preconstruction review and obtain a PSD permit, ideally to prevent 
serious environmental deterioration.43 The PSD program demands 
that new sources install the “best available control technology,”44 a 
standard determined on a case-by-case basis with a floor established 
by the NSPS program level.45 In contrast to the PSD program, the 
more stringent NNSR program governs new sources within nonat-
tainment areas.46 Accordingly, the NNSR program requires new 
emissions sources to utilize a “lowest achievable emission rate,” the 
strictest emissions limitation contained in a state implementation 
plan for an industrial category.47 Furthermore, prior to acquiring a 
NNSR permit, the applicant must obtain offsets.48 
 Nevertheless, Congress did not desire to dampen economic growth 
through the implementation of pollution-control technology.49 In a 
passage oft-cited by the utility industry in support of the RMRR ex-
emption, the NSR program seeks “to allow reasonable economic 
growth to continue in an area while making reasonable further pro-
gress to assure attainment of the [pollution-control] standards by a 
fixed date.”50 Accordingly, Congress viewed installing pollution-
control technology at the time of construction as less costly than ret-
rofitting other facilities once pollution-control ceilings were reached.51  
                                                                                                                      
 42. Id. at 136. 
 43. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7475(a)(1)-(2). In order to obtain this permit, an applicant must dem-
onstrate that the project will not generate new or increased emissions in excess of NAAQS. 
Id. § 7475(a)(3). 
 44. Id. § 7475(a)(4). 
 45. See PARKER, supra note 8, at 2. The determination of what technology constitutes 
best available involves an evaluation of the most effective control technologies, considering 
energy, environmental, and economic impacts. 40 C.F.R. § 51.166(b)(12) (2004). For a thor-
ough analysis of the process for the best available control technology determination, see 
Hawkins & Ternes, supra note 17, at 157-64. 
 46. 42 U.S.C §§ 7501-7515 (2000). 
 47. Id. § 7501(3). The lowest achievable emission rate does not account for energy or 
economic factors. See Nathaniel Lord Martin, Note, The Reform of New Source Review: 
Toward a More Balanced Approach, 23 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 351, 357-58 (2004). 
 48. 42 U.S.C. § 7503(a)(1)(A) (2000). 
 49. As previously noted, the 1977 Amendments to the CAA scaled back the ambitious 
goals of the 1970 Amendments providing a more realistic timetable. For example, compare 
congressional discussions held during the enactment of the 1977 Amendments concerning 
the balance of economic growth with achievement of air pollution reductions to congres-
sional discussions held during enactment of the 1970 Amendments. During the 1970 con-
gressional discussions, Senator Muskie asserted that Congress’s “responsibility is to estab-
lish what the public interest requires to protect the health of persons.” 116 CONG. REC. 
32,900, 32,902 (1970). Moreover, the Senate committee noted that “existing sources of pol-
lutants either should meet the standard of the law or be closed down.” S. REP. NO. 91-1196, 
at 2-3 (1970), reprinted in ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, LEGAL COMPILATION: 
STATUTES AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 15-16 (Jan. 1975). 
 50. H.R. REP. NO. 294, at 211 (1977), as reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1077, 1290. 
 51. H.R. REP. NO. 294, at 185 (1977), as reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1077, 1264. 
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C.  The Modification Rule 
 With the creation of NSR, the EPA shifted its focus from enforcing 
NSPS emissions rates to complying with NAAQS in nonattainment 
areas and satisfying the PSD program within attainment areas.52 
Rather than establish an entirely new set of definitions for the NSR 
program, the 1977 Amendments essentially adopted many of the ex-
isting NSPS definitions.53 For example, NSR incorporated the NSPS 
program’s definition of “modification” into its definition of “construc-
tion.”54 Clearly, Congress intended to alleviate problematic defini-
tional nuances that have the potential to arise when creating multi-
ple regulatory schemes sharing a central theme—protection of air re-
sources.55 In fact, congressional discussions focusing on the modifica-
tion provision during the 1977 Amendments mirror those held during 
the enactment of the 1970 Amendments: “The purpose of the ‘modifi-
cation’ rule is to ensure that pollution-control measures are under-
taken when they can be most effective, at the time of new or modified 
construction.”56 Therefore, the modification rule constitutes the 
means by which the EPA regulates existing facilities under the 
NSPS and NSR programs.57 A source must undergo a “physical 
change” which increases air pollution to satisfy the definition of 
modification.58 
                                                                                                                      
 52. See PARKER, supra note 8, at 3. 
 53. Specifically, 42 U.S.C. § 7479(2)(C) asserts that “[t]he term ‘construction’ when 
used in connection with any source or facility, includes the modification (as defined in sec-
tion 7411(a) of this title) of any source or facility.” See also WEPCO, 893 F.2d 901, 905 (7th 
Cir. 1990) (“Congress also essentially adopted its NSPS definition of ‘modification’ for the 
PSD program.”). 
 54. 42 U.S.C. § 7479(2)(C) (2000). 
 55. See United States v. Duke Energy Corp., 278 F. Supp. 2d 619, 631 (M.D.N.C. 
2003) (citing 123 CONG. REC. H11,956, 3665 (daily ed. Nov. 1, 1977)) (noting that Congress 
incorporated 42 U.S.C. § 7479(2)(C) to conform the NSR definitions with other parts of the 
NSPS), aff’d on other grounds by 411 F.3d 539 (4th Cir. 2005). The Fourth Circuit affirmed 
the district court’s grant of summary judgment; however, the court based its affirmation on 
the EPA’s interpretation of “modification.” Id. at 546-47. Specifically, the Fourth Circuit 
determined that the EPA applied a different definition of “modification” under the PSD 
program than it did under the NSPS program. Id. at 546. As such, the EPA violated the 
congressional mandate that the NSPS definition of “modification” should be used when ap-
plying the provisions under the PSD program. Id. 
 56. Nat’l-Southwire Aluminum Co. v. EPA, 838 F.2d 835, 843 (6th Cir. 1988) (Boggs, 
J., dissenting) (citing 116 CONG. REC. 32,918 (remarks of Sen. Cooper), reprinted in 1 S. 
COMM. ON PUBLIC WORKS, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS OF 
1970, at 260 (1974)). 
 57. The PSD program is triggered when “construction” commences after August 7, 
1977, the effective date of the legislation. See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. 
No. 95-95, § 406, 91 Stat. 685, 795-96 (1977). Construction “includes the modification . . . of 
any source or facility.” 42 U.S.C. § 7479(2)(C) (2000). Similarly, the NSPS is triggered by 
“construction or modification” of any stationary source. Id. § 7411(a)(2). 
 58. “The term ‘modification’ means any physical change in, or change in the method of 
operation of, a stationary source which increases the amount of any air pollutant emitted 
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D.  RMRR Exemption 
 Adoption of the NSPS definition of modification had major reper-
cussions for those facilities subject to NSR. Specifically, as Judge 
Cudahy noted in the influential WEPCO decision, “trivial activities 
[such as] the replacement of leaky pipes” may result in an increase in 
emissions and subject that activity to NSR.59 Therefore, the EPA 
promulgated regulations exempting certain activities.60 The most 
contentious of these provisions, and central to the EPA’s Final Rule, 
exempts “[m]aintenance, repair, and replacement which the Admin-
istrator determines to be routine for a source category.”61 Obviously, 
the EPA’s intention in promulgating what came to be known as the 
RMRR exemption was to avoid the situation Judge Cudahy de-
scribed. However, utility companies recognized that the RMRR ex-
emption enabled them to upgrade or extend the life of their facilities, 
while avoiding NSR, by fitting life-extension efforts into their routine 
maintenance schedule.62 In fact, utilities began to refer to the plans 
                                                                                                                      
by such source or which results in the emission of any air pollutant not previously emit-
ted.” Id. § 7411(a)(4). 
 However, rules promulgated by the EPA provided a distinction between modification of 
existing emissions sources under NSPS and modification of existing emissions sources un-
der NSR. WEPCO, 893 F.2d at 905. Whereas a physical change resulting in an increase of 
the facility’s hourly rate of emissions constitutes a modification under NSPS, 40 C.F.R. § 
60.14 (1988), the modification provision of NSR is not triggered unless the physical change 
results in an increase of the facility’s total amount of emissions. Id. § 52.21(b)(23)(i). The 
NSR program activates once sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxide emissions pass a threshold 
of forty tons per year. Id. 
 59. WEPCO, 893 F.2d at 905. 
 60. The EPA promulgated six specific exceptions. However, as this Note focuses on 
the EPA’s October 27, 2003 rule regarding the routine maintenance exception, it will not 
elaborate upon the other five exceptions. Nevertheless, these five exceptions are as follows: 
The following shall not, by themselves, be considered modifications under this 
part: 
. . . . 
  (2) An increase in production rate of an existing facility, if that increase 
can be accomplished without a capital expenditure on that facility. 
  (3) An increase in the hours of operation. 
  (4) Use of an alternative fuel or raw material if . . . the existing facility was 
designed to accommodate that alternative use. . . . 
  (5) The addition or use of any system or device whose primary function is the 
reduction of air pollutants, except when an emission-control system is removed 
or is replaced by a system which [is] determine[d] to be less environmentally 
beneficial. 
  (6) The relocation or change in ownership of an existing facility. 
40 C.F.R. § 60.14(e)(2)-(6) (2004) (discussing the NSPS program); see also id. § 52.21(b)(2) 
(2004) (discussing the PSD program). 
 61. 40 C.F.R. § 60.14(e)(1) (2004) (discussing the NSPS program); see also id. § 
52.21(b)(2)(iii) (2004) (discussing the PSD program). 
 62. PARKER, supra note 8, at 3. 
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for lengthening a facility’s life, formerly known as life-extension pro-
grams, as rehabilitation programs.63  
 As such, the demarcation between “modification” and “routine 
maintenance” became increasingly more difficult to identify as life-
extension efforts were merely folded into maintenance and repair 
schedules.64 As noted by Judge Sargus in United States v. Ohio Edi-
son Co., “[T]he analysis required to distinguish between a modifica-
tion sufficient to trigger compliance from routine maintenance, re-
pair and replacement is complex”;65 therefore, it often required 
lengthy, fact-intensive examinations by the court.66 Generally, courts 
identify RMRR activities as those projects of limited expense, typi-
cally performed by in-house employees, which occur regularly and re-
sult in no permanent improvements.67 On the other hand, capital im-
provements falling under the auspices of “modification” are expected 
to be projects large in scope that require outside contractors, increase 
the value of the unit, and occur irregularly.68 
III. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE EPA’S MODIFICATION RULE 
AND RMRR EXEMPTION 
 In order to understand the reasoning behind or at least the impe-
tus for the ERP, necessity demands an examination of the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit’s decision in WEPCO69 regarding 
the RMRR exemption and the three subsequent decisions by district 
courts that had attempted to flesh it out: United States v. Ohio Edi-
                                                                                                                      
 63. Id. (citing Jason Makansi, Rehab: Get the Most from the Existing Asset Base, 
POWER, June 1999, at 30-40). 
 64. Id. 
 65. 276 F. Supp. 2d 829, 834 (S.D. Ohio 2003). 
 66. See, e.g., id. (evaluating thirty-four parts replacements on eleven production units 
over fifteen years in a sixty-two-page decision); United States v. Duke Energy Corp., 278 F. 
Supp. 2d 619 (M.D.N.C. 2003) (evaluating twenty-nine projects at eight coal-fired facilities 
over thirteen years in a thirty-six-page decision). 
 67. Ohio Edison Co., 276 F. Supp. 2d at 834. 
 68. Id. 
 69. 893 F.2d 901, 905 (7th Cir. 1990). 
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son Co.,70 United States v. Southern Indiana Gas & Electric Co. 
(SIGECO),71 and United States v. Duke Energy Corp.72  
A.  Wisconsin Electric & Power Co. v. Reilly (WEPCO) 
 Undeniably, WEPCO constitutes the seminal decision in regard to 
defining the boundaries of the RMRR exemption under NSR,73 even 
forming the basis of a portion of the EPA’s analysis in the Final 
Rule.74 In an effort to extend the life of five coal-fired generating 
units at its facility on Lake Michigan, north of Milwaukee, Wisconsin 
Electric & Power Company (Wisconsin Electric) submitted a pro-
posed life-extension project to the Wisconsin Public Service Commis-
sion in 1988.75 The Commission then consulted other government 
agencies, including the EPA, as to the viability and potential effects 
of the project. Subsequently, the EPA determined that the project 
constituted a “physical change” resulting in an increase in production 
and air emissions; therefore, the facility would be subject to PSD re-
quirements through the modification rule.76 Furthermore, the EPA 
claimed that Wisconsin Electric’s life-extension project did not qual-
ify for the RMRR exemption.77 
 Ultimately, the WEPCO decision established three principle con-
cepts that would permeate the contentious history of the RMRR ex-
emption. The first two concepts concern the two essential elements to 
demonstrate a “modification.” First, the Seventh Circuit established 
that “modification” should be broadly interpreted to include any 
physical change of a facility.78 Second, WEPCO defined the emissions 
increase necessary to trigger the modification rule under both NSPS 
and NSR programs.79 Third, the decision validated the EPA’s multi-
                                                                                                                      
 70. The Ohio Edison Co. case involves the determination of NSR violations at Ohio 
Edison’s W.H. Sammis Station plant in Stratton, Ohio. Following a favorable verdict for 
the EPA in Ohio Edison Co., on March 18, 2005, the parties entered into a Consent Decree 
requiring installation of state-of-the-art pollution-control equipment at Sammis Station, 
resulting in annual reductions of sulfur dioxide emissions by 134,500 tons and nitrous ox-
ide emissions by 28,567 tons. Following the installation of pollution-control technology at 
other Ohio Edison facilities, the total emissions reductions amount to over 212,000 tons per 
year. These upgrades are expected to cost approximately $1.1 billion. In addition, Ohio 
Edison must pay an $8.5 million civil penalty. Press Release, EPA, U.S. Announces Set-
tlement of Landmark Clean Air Act Case Against Ohio Edison–Utility Will Spend $1.1 Bil-
lion to Reduce Air Pollution by 212,500 Tons Per Year (March 18, 2005), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/cases/civil/caa/ohioedison.html. 
 71. 245 F. Supp. 2d 994 (S.D. Ind. 2003). 
 72. 278 F. Supp. 2d 619 (M.D.N.C. 2003). 
 73. SIGECO, 245 F. Supp. 2d at 1015. 
 74. Final Rule, supra note 9, at 61,256-57. 
 75. WEPCO, 893 F.2d 901, 905 (7th Cir. 1990). 
 76. Id. at 907. 
 77. Id. at 911. 
 78. Id. at 910. 
 79. Id. at 915-18. 
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factor evaluation of the RMRR exemption.80 In doing so, the court 
held that no one factor should be dispositive, but the EPA should 
consider “cost, magnitude, nature, and frequency” of activities in de-
termining whether the RMRR exemption applies.81  
1.  Seventh Circuit’s Interpretation of Physical Change Under the 
Modification Rule 
 Wisconsin Electric argued that “modification,” as it is used to trig-
ger the NSPS and NSR programs, should be defined narrowly.82 Spe-
cifically, notwithstanding that the life-extension project involved ex-
tensive activities including the removal of units from operation for 
nine-month periods, these activities would not “alter” the facility 
and, as such, should not bring the facility under the auspices of the 
NSPS and NSR programs.83 In making this argument, Wisconsin 
Electric cited the Webster New World Dictionary’s definition of “mod-
ify” and claimed that replacement of components did not “change or 
alter” the facility, but merely permitted the facility to operate as it 
had prior to equipment deterioration.84 
 However, the Seventh Circuit rejected Wisconsin Electric’s inter-
pretation of modify. Citing the Supreme Court’s decision in Chevron 
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,85 the Seventh 
Circuit held that more weight must be given to “congressional direc-
tion and agency construction” than the common vernacular appear-
ing in a dictionary.86 Therefore, characterization of an action as a ba-
sic or fundamental change to a facility was irrelevant.87 Rather, Con-
gress defined “modification” as “any physical change,”88 and that 
meaning should not be limited to physical changes exceeding some 
threshold magnitude.89 
 Furthermore, citing the congressional intent of the CAA, the Sev-
enth Circuit attacked Wisconsin Electric’s definition of modification 
as unreasonable.90 In a theme that reverberates throughout the con-
tentious history of the RMRR exemption, Judge Cudahy speculated 
that if Wisconsin Electric’s argument were adopted, major facilities 
                                                                                                                      
 80. Id. at 913. 
 81. SIGECO, 245 F. Supp. 2d 994, 1015 (S.D. Ind. 2003) (citing WEPCO, 893 F.2d 
901, 913 (7th Cir. 1990)). 
 82. WEPCO, 893 F.2d at 908. 
 83. Id. at 908-09. 
 84. Id. (citing Brief for the Petitioner at 32-33). 
 85. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).  
 86. WEPCO, 893 F.2d at 908. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(4) (2000) (emphasis omitted)). 
 89. Id. (citing Ala. Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323, 400 (D.C. Cir. 1979)). 
 90. Id. 
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could avoid NSPS and NSR application “into the indefinite future.”91 
However, the Seventh Circuit noted that Congress intended to fur-
ther the goals of the CAA while allowing the continuance of economic 
growth but elected not to require existing facilities to install emis-
sions-control technology immediately.92 To balance economic growth 
while enforcing emissions standards, Congress recognized that the 
installation of emissions-control technology during construction 
would be less costly than retrofitting facilities once an area reaches 
nonattainment status.93 Hence, Wisconsin Electric’s definition of 
modification would effectively eviscerate Congress’s desire to not 
permanently exempt existing facilities from the NSPS and NSR pro-
grams.94 
2.  Seventh Circuit’s Interpretation of Net Emissions Increase 
Under the Modification Rule 
 As to the second element in the definition of modification, the 
Seventh Circuit first explained the crucial differences between the 
NSPS and NSR programs in regard to emissions increases.95 Specifi-
cally, whereas the NSPS program regulates emissions increases as a 
permissible volume per hour of discharge,96 the NSR program exam-
ines emissions increases measured in terms of total annual emis-
sions.97 Next, the Seventh Circuit described the proper method, un-
der the EPA’s regulations, to calculate whether an alteration re-
sulted in an emissions increase, thereby subjecting the project to the 
NSPS and/or NSR programs.98 Specifically, under the NSPS pro-
gram, a unit’s emissions at current maximum capacity should be 
compared to that unit’s potential emissions at maximum capacity af-
ter the alteration to determine if the project results in an emissions 
increase.99 In effect, this calculation disregards the unit’s emissions 
at its maximum design capacity.100 In general, the Seventh Circuit 
adopted similar methodology for the NSR program by rejecting the 
EPA’s argument that the “potential to emit” should be used to de-
termine future emissions.101 Rather, the calculation should be based 
                                                                                                                      
 91. Id. at 909. 
 92. Id. (citing H.R. REP NO. 95-294, at 211 (1977), as reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
1077, 1290). 
 93. Id. (citing H.R. REP. NO. 95-294, at 185 (1977), as reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
at 1264). 
 94. Id. at 909. 
 95. Id. at 913-18. 
 96. Id. at 913 (citing 40 C.F.R. § 60.14 (1988)). 
 97. Id. at 913-14 (citing 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(b)(2)(i) (1988)). 
 98. Id. at 913-18. 
 99. Id. at 913. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 916-17 (internal quotation omitted). 
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on maximum emissions generated under conditions at which the fa-
cility is meant to be operated after completion of the project.102 
 Applying this analysis to Wisconsin Electric’s proposed activities, 
the Seventh Circuit held that the EPA’s assumption of continuous 
unit operations to arrive at a “potential-to-emit” baseline for the net 
increase evaluation violated the language of the NSR.103 Rather, if 
the EPA desired to challenge Wisconsin Electric’s proposed activities 
as a modification under the NSR, it must use an “actual-to-actual” 
test. That is, the EPA must demonstrate an emissions increase based 
on a comparison of the unit’s current actual emissions to the unit’s 
actual emissions generated during normal operations following the 
completion of the proposed activities.104 
3.  The EPA’s Implementation of the RMRR Exemption 
 In addition to claiming that the life-extension activities should not 
constitute modification of the facility, Wisconsin Electric argued that 
if the facility was subject to the NSPS and NSR programs, the pro-
posed activities amounted to nothing more than routine maintenance 
and repair and, thus, satisfied the requirements of the EPA’s RMRR 
exemption.105 As such, the EPA’s determination that the life-
extension activities failed to satisfy the RMRR exemption constituted 
an arbitrary and capricious application of the EPA’s own regula-
tions.106  
 In rejecting Wisconsin Electric’s argument, the Seventh Circuit 
granted substantial deference to the EPA’s interpretation of its own 
rules107 and concluded that the EPA’s examination of a variety of fac-
tors to determine whether the life-extension activities were routine 
did not constitute an arbitrary and capricious application of its regu-
lations.108 Moreover, in approving the EPA’s method of evaluating 
various factors on a case-by-case basis, the court gave “notice that 
the routine maintenance exemption was a multi-factor test, and that 
no one factor would have dispositive weight.”109 For example, the 
EPA evaluated the “nature, extent, purpose, frequency,” cost, and 
                                                                                                                      
 102. Id. at 917-18. The potential to emit should not be so broadly construed to allow 
the EPA to use emissions rates generated by a plant operating under the “worst conceiv-
able” conditions. United States v. La.-Pac. Corp., 682 F. Supp. 1141, 1158 (D. Colo. 1988) 
(citing Ala. Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323 (D.C. Cir. 1979)). 
 103. WEPCO, 893 F.2d 901, 917-18 (7th Cir. 1990). 
 104. Id. at 918. 
 105. Id. at 911-12. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 910 (citing Lyng v. Payne, 476 U.S. 926, 939 (1986) (according substantial 
deference to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations, particularly the subject 
regulations that are highly technical and complex)). 
 108. Id. 
 109. SIGECO, 245 F. Supp. 2d 994, 1015-16 (S.D. Ind. 2003).  
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historical precedent of Wisconsin Electric’s proposed activities to “ar-
rive at a common-sense finding” as to the routine character of the ac-
tivities.110 
B.  U.S. District Court Decisions Following WEPCO 
1.  United States v. Southern Indiana Gas & Electric Co. 
(SIGECO) 
 Subsequent to the WEPCO decision, utilities struggled to deter-
mine if their life-extension projects would satisfy the requirements of 
the EPA’s multifactor test for the RMRR exemption or if these pro-
jects would constitute a nonroutine activity subject to the NSPS or 
NSR programs.111 Consequently, in the preamble to an EPA rule con-
cerning emissions tests applicable to utility generating units, the 
agency attempted to clarify its judicially approved multifactor test. 
Specifically, to determine the routine nature of equipment repair, the 
EPA must evaluate whether that particular equipment is typically 
replaced or repaired by other sources within the industry.112 
 More or less a direct result of the confusion inherent in the RMRR 
exemption, SIGECO gave the judicial system an opportunity to con-
sider the reasonableness of the EPA’s actions.113 Conceding the estab-
lishment of the WEPCO multifactor analysis, Southern Indiana Gas 
& Electric Co. (Indiana Electric) argued that the EPA’s analysis of a 
single factor—frequency of activities—constituted an unreasonable 
                                                                                                                      
 110. WEPCO, 893 F.2d 901, 910-11 (7th Cir. 1990). Several factors, in particular, bol-
stered the EPA’s determination. First, Wisconsin Electric’s application for the life-
extension project noted that projects “falling into the category of repetitive maintenance 
that are normally performed during scheduled equipment outages . . . are not included in 
this application.” Id. at 911 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis omitted). Second, the 
EPA project manager testified that the agency could not find one instance of a rehabilita-
tion project approaching the scope and magnitude of Wisconsin Electric’s proposal. Id. In-
deed, the proposed project was expected to cost in excess of $70.5 million. Id. at 912. 
 111. The EPA attempted on numerous instances to clarify its interpretation and appli-
cation of the RMRR exemption. However, these attempts often did nothing but muddy the 
waters even further. As noted by Judge Sargus, “While the law has always been clear, the 
enforcement strategies of the EPA have not.” United States v. Ohio Edison Co., 276 F. 
Supp. 2d 829, 833 (S.D. Ohio 2003). For examples of the EPA’s ill-fated attempts at clarifi-
cation, see SIGECO, 245 F. Supp. 2d at 1002-04, which discusses comments published in 
the Federal Register, letters drafted by the EPA’s Assistant Administrator for Air Pro-
grams and the EPA’s Director of Air Quality Planning and Standards, and the EPA’s de-
termination of routine maintenance for other projects. 
 112. Requirements for Preparation, Adoption and Submittal of Implementation Plans; 
Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans; Standards of Performance for New 
Stationary Sources, 57 Fed Reg. 32,314, 32,326 (July 21, 1992). 
 113. David M. Meezan, ‘New Source Review’ Litigation: No End in Sight, ANDREWS 
ENVTL. LITIG. REP., Sept. 2004, at 24, 24-25. However, whereas the issues in WEPCO arose 
due to Wisconsin Electric’s submittal of a construction application, SIGECO sprang from a 
motion for summary judgment on an EPA enforcement action regarding modifications pre-
viously completed at three production units. SIGECO, 245 F. Supp. 2d at 999-1000. 
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interpretation of its own rules.114 In particular, Indiana Electric as-
serted that the EPA historically examined the frequency of activities 
at a particular type of unit across the industry as a whole.115 As such, 
regardless of whether Indiana Electric had performed a specific ac-
tivity on a generating unit in the past or not, Indiana Electric may 
still qualify for the RMRR exemption if other utilities performed 
similar projects. As in WEPCO, the court granted substantial defer-
ence to the EPA’s interpretation, particularly due to the EPA’s ex-
perience in such a “highly technical and specialized area.”116 In addi-
tion, echoing Judge Cudahy’s opinion that Congress intended for ex-
isting facilities to be subject to the CAA when most cost-effective, the 
court in SIGECO preferred the broad interpretation of the modifica-
tion rule and the narrow interpretation of the RMRR exemption to 
ensure that utilities were unable to make an “end run” around 
NSR.117  
2.  United States v. Ohio Edison Co. 
 Similar to the argument presented in SIGECO, Ohio Edison Co. 
involved a challenge to the EPA’s interpretation of the RMRR exemp-
tion as excessively narrow.118 Ohio Edison argued that the exclusion 
should be more broadly interpreted because the EPA’s interpretation 
was unreasonable.119 However, the court reaffirmed the decision in 
SIGECO that the EPA should examine the individual unit to deter-
mine the character of the activities, rather than the entire indus-
try.120  
 As in WEPCO and SIGECO, the court proceeded to dispose of 
Ohio Edison’s argument by referencing the plain language of the 
CAA.121 Echoing statements made by the previous two courts, Judge 
                                                                                                                      
 114. SIGECO, 245 F. Supp. 2d at 1008. 
 115. Id. at 1009. 
 116. Id. at 1010. 
 117. Id. at 1009. In addition, the court disposed of Indiana Electric’s fair notice chal-
lenge stating that frequency comprised but one factor considered by the EPA, and the ul-
timate decision rested in the determination of frequency. Id. at 1012. Moreover, perform-
ance of such maintenance activities amounted to a calculated risk not subject to the protec-
tion of the fair notice doctrine. In short, Indiana Electric failed to inform the EPA of these 
activities and, therefore, could not use the fair notice doctrine as a shield against subse-
quent prosecution. Id. at 1023. 
 118. United States v. Ohio Edison Co., 276 F. Supp. 2d 829, 854 (S.D. Ohio 2003).  
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 855. 
 121. Id. However, in Ohio Edison, the court did not dispose of the question so rapidly. 
Although quickly justifying the EPA’s interpretation, the court proceeded to conduct a de-
tailed factual inquiry into the nature, purpose, frequency, and cost of activities, as well as 
the alleged increase in emissions and the methodology behind its calculation. Id. at 858-83. 
Certainly, such detailed analysis may lead the cynic to question Judge Sargus’s contention 
that the distinction between routine maintenance and capital improvements is “hardly 
subtle.” Id. at 834. 
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Sargus noted that adoption of Ohio Edison’s broad interpretation 
would engulf the modification rule, thereby emasculating the CAA.122 
Moreover, the court discussed that the RMRR exemption constituted 
a rule promulgated by the EPA, not a congressional mandate incor-
porated as part of the CAA; as such, it must correspond with the 
statutory intent of the CAA, which was the eventual installation of 
state-of-the-art pollution-control technology.123 
3.  United States v. Duke Energy Corp. 
 Insofar as WEPCO, SIGECO, and Ohio Edison Co. were victories 
for the EPA and its interpretations of the CAA, Duke Energy marked 
the first defeat that the EPA suffered during judicial review of its 
RMRR exemption determinations.124 Rather than follow the SIGECO 
and Ohio Edison Co. decisions’ acceptance of evaluating projects on a 
unit-by-unit basis, Judge Bullock held that the EPA’s repeated refer-
ence to similar projects within an industrial classification confirmed 
Duke Energy’s assertion.125 
 In applying the WEPCO holding, the court focused on a particular 
correspondence between the EPA and Wisconsin Electric, which 
stated that the subject activities in WEPCO were unprecedented 
throughout the industry.126 Furthermore, Judge Bullock noted that 
the EPA’s own argument in WEPCO focused on the similarity of Wis-
consin Electric’s proposed activities to those at other facilities.127 Ac-
cordingly, the EPA’s evaluation of activities at the eight Duke En-
ergy facilities should not have focused on the frequency of the subject 
activities at particular generating units; rather, the EPA’s frequency 
analysis should have examined similar activities at other facilities.128 
                                                                                                                      
 122. “[T]he CAA should not be interpreted in a way that ‘would open the vistas of in-
definite immunity from the provisions of NSPS and PSD.’ ” Id. at 855 (quoting WEPCO, 
893 F.2d 901, 909 (7th Cir. 1990)). 
 123. Id. at 855. 
 124. United States v. Duke Energy Corp. was issued only nineteen days after Ohio Edi-
son Co. and concerned twenty-nine projects performed at eight coal-fired generating sta-
tions located throughout the Carolinas. Duke Energy, 278 F. Supp. 2d 619, 623 (M.D.N.C. 
2003).  
 125. Id. at 635. In addition, the court agreed with Duke Energy that the calculation of 
future actual emissions required the EPA to hold constant hours and conditions of opera-
tion. Therefore, a net emissions increase only results from an increase in the hourly rate of 
emissions. Id. at 641. In contrast, the EPA argued that excluding the emissions caused by 
an increase in the hours of operation in calculating annual net emissions discounts the dif-
ferences between the NSPS and NSR programs. Id. at 643. As a result, the NSPS program 
becomes indistinguishable from the NSR program. Id.   
 126. Id. at 633. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 634. Judge Bullock focused on the EPA’s statements concerning life-
extension projects, specifically statements made by EPA officials in reference to a report 
prepared by the Government Accounting Office (GAO) evaluating life-extension issues at 
coal-fired facilities. Id. at 636. In response to the GAO report, EPA Assistant Administra-
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Therefore, the court reasoned that EPA statements on Wisconsin 
Electric’s life-extension project confirmed the belief that activities 
may qualify under the RMRR exemption if deemed routine through-
out the industry.129 
IV. THE FINAL RULE 
 As a result of the confounding combination of judicial interpreta-
tions and EPA statements discussed above, the utility industry ar-
gued that the NSR program had become so complex and confusing 
that the industry could no longer predict the demarcation between 
routine maintenance and significant physical change.130 Therefore, in 
the mid-1990s, the EPA began to reconsider the RMRR exemption 
with an eye toward revising its regulations to facilitate better under-
standing.131 Unfortunately, these efforts remained unproductive for a 
number of years.132 Nevertheless, in 2000, the EPA revisited the 
RMRR exemption and suggested that a bright-line approach would 
provide a more efficient means of identifying routine activities than 
                                                                                                                      
tor William Rosenberg stated that the majority of life-extension projects will not be similar 
to those undertaken in WEPCO; therefore, the WEPCO ruling is not expected to affect life-
extension projects significantly. Id. at 637 (citing Letter from Rosenberg to Dingell (June 
19, 1991)). The court additionally cites a letter from EPA Assistant Administrator for Air 
and Radiation as evidence that the RMRR exemption applies to restoration projects. Id. 
(citing Letter from Nichols to Lewis (May 31, 1995)). 
 129. Id. at 637. However, in making this inference, the court in Duke Energy failed to 
differentiate between the wide variety of projects that may occur under the rubric of a “life 
extension project.” Id. Although this Note questions Judge Sargus’s overly detailed analy-
sis of activities at question in Ohio Edison, the distinction between routine activities and 
capital improvements necessitates such analysis to avoid identifying all activities per-
formed under the moniker of “life extension” as routine, or vice versa. For that reason, 
perhaps Judge Bullock’s contention in the Duke Energy opinion that a “detailed description 
of the work . . . would be lengthy and ultimately unnecessary” results in the far-reaching 
principle that the EPA believes “life-extension” projects qualify under the RMRR exemp-
tion. Id. at 624. 
 130. Barcott, supra note 8. 
 131. DAVID R. WOOLEY & ELIZABETH M. MORSS, THE CLEAN AIR HANDBOOK § 1:38 
(13th ed. 2003). 
 132. Id. According to the then-Assistant Administrator for Air and Radiation, Robert 
Perciasepe, the slow movement in RMRR reform during the Clinton Administration was 
not due to lack of effort. Barcott, supra note 8. According to Perciasepe, the EPA convened 
ad hoc working groups comprised of members from the utility industry, environmental 
leaders, state and local regulators, and public health officials; however, no mutually ac-
ceptable compromise could be made. Id. He went on to state that the Clinton Administra-
tion EPA refused to sacrifice public health concerns and that it was impossible “to reach 
agreement with [the utility industry] because what they really wanted was to not have to 
[comply with NSR requirements].” Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 However, although NSR reform came to a halt during the Clinton years, the new direc-
tor for the Air-Enforcement Division, Bruce Buckheit, began compiling large amounts of 
data concerning industry-wide violations of the NSR program. Id. Due to these aggressive 
enforcement tactics and the utility industry’s unwillingness to amend these potential in-
fractions, the Department of Justice, on behalf of the EPA, filed seven lawsuits in Novem-
ber 1999 against major utilities such as FirstEnergy, American Electric Power, Cinergy, 
and subsidiaries of Southern Company, among others. Id. 
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the current case-by-case approach.133 On December 31, 2002, the EPA 
issued a proposed rule seeking to clarify the definition of “modifica-
tion” and the RMRR exemption.134 Following a 120-day public com-
ment period, rather than promulgating the entire proposed rule, on 
October 27, 2003, the EPA finalized only the “equipment replacement 
provision” (ERP) of the proposed rule.135  
A.  Creation of the Equipment Replacement Provision 
 Noting criticisms of the existing case-by-case approach136 by in-
dustry commentators concerned with the expense and delay associ-
ated with the NSR program,137 the EPA sought to exempt replace-
ment of functionally similar components.138 According to the EPA, the 
lack of such an exemption effectively created a disincentive for utili-
ties to replace inefficient components or, on the other hand, an incen-
tive to replace these components with similarly inferior compo-
nents.139 Moreover, due to this lack of effective replacement, produc-
tive capacity of coal-firing generators supposedly suffered, an effect 
that does not  
advance[] the central policy of the major NSR program . . . which is 
not to cut back on emissions from existing major stationary 
sources through limitations on their productive capacity, but 
rather to ensure that they will install state-of-the-art pollution 
controls at a juncture where it otherwise makes sense to do so.140 
 As such, the Final Rule seeks to clarify the RMRR exemption 
principally through the addition of the ERP, which identifies compo-
nents that will automatically qualify for the RMRR exemption.141 
Specifically, the Final Rule exempts replacement activities if (1) the 
subject component of the process unit is replaced by an identical or 
functionally equivalent component that does not alter the basic de-
                                                                                                                      
 133. See generally U.S. EPA, NEW SOURCE REVIEW: REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT (June 
2002). 
 134. Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) and Non-Attainment New-Source 
Review (NSR): Routine Maintenance, Repair and Replacement, 67 Fed. Reg. 80,290 (Dec. 
31, 2002) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51-52). 
 135. Final Rule, supra note 9. 
 136. Although promulgating the ERP, the Final Rule permits a utility to request a 
case-by-case determination “as an alternative and/or supplement to today’s ERP.” Id. at 
61,252. 
 137. Id. at 61,250. In addition to the ERP, the proposed rule also contained another 
cost-based approach for determining whether activities constitute routine maintenance. 
This approach, known as the “annual maintenance, repair and replacement allowance,” 
would have set an annual allowance for a particular industrial facility based upon an in-
dustry-specific percentage, but it was not implemented. Id. at 61,251. 
 138. Id. at 61,250. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. at 61,252. 
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sign parameters of the process unit or result in an inability to satisfy 
emissions and operational limits, and (2) the cost of the particular 
component is less than twenty percent of the replacement value of 
the process unit.142 
 In attempting to close potential loopholes in this language, the Fi-
nal Rule establishes definitions or guidelines for such concepts as 
“replacement value,”143 “identical or functionally equivalent” compo-
nents,144 and “process unit.”145 First, the EPA identifies several meth-
ods that may be used to calculate a process unit’s replacement value, 
including replacement cost, inflation-adjusted invested cost, insur-
ance value, or any other accounting procedure established by the 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles.146 Second, the Final Rule 
attempts to define what is meant by “identical or functionally equiva-
lent.” In particular, the Final Rule notes that, although replacement 
components must not alter design parameters, if the replacement 
component increases efficiency, then the increased efficiency will not 
affect the replacement activity’s exclusion under the Final Rule.147 
Third, the Final Rule states that the definition of “process unit” mir-
rors that provided by 40 C.F.R. § 63.41.148 Although somewhat vague, 
this definition attempts to conform the ERP with “practical under-
standings of what constitutes a discrete production process.”149 How-
ever, the Final Rule explicitly excludes pollution-control equipment150 
and includes nonemitting equipment151 in the determination of the 
process unit. 
 Due to the multiple unresolved enforcement actions initiated by 
the EPA under the Clinton Administration,152 the provisions regard-
ing the retroactive application of the Final Rule constitute another 
                                                                                                                      
 142. Id. at 61,251. For a thorough analysis and dissection of the individual components 
of the ERP, see Matthew H. Snell, Note, Major Modifications and Routine Maintenance: 
Does the EPA’s New Exclusion Equal More Pollution?, 39 NEW ENG. L. REV. 207, 230-35 
(2004). 
 143. Final Rule, supra note 9, at 61,252.  
 144. Id. at 61,252-54. 
 145. Id. at 61,259. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. at 61,253. (“We need not and should not treat efficiency as a basic design pa-
rameter as we do not believe NSR was intended to impede industry in making energy and 
process efficiency improvements.”). 
 148. Id. at 61,259. “Process . . . unit means any collection of structures and/or equip-
ment, that processes[,] assembles, applies, or otherwise uses material inputs to produce or 
store an intermediate or final product. A single facility may contain more than one process 
. . . unit.” 40 C.F.R. § 63.41 (2004). 
 149. Final Rule, supra note 9, at 61,259. 
 150. Id. at 61,260. 
 151. Id. at 61,261-62. 
 152. See supra note 132. 
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contentious issue.153 The Final Rule specifically notes that the CAA 
contains no express grant of retroactive applicability for promulgated 
rules; therefore, the rule does not apply to any ongoing enforcement 
actions.154 In addition, if the EPA previously determined that a util-
ity’s life-extension activities failed to meet the RMRR exemption, 
thereby requiring pollution-control equipment, the Final Rule would 
not invalidate those control requirements.155 
B.  Potential Effects of the ERP 
1.  Installation of Pollution-Control Technology 
 As has been the case throughout the contentious history of the 
RMRR exemption, critics of the Final Rule contend that the ERP ef-
fectively exempts coal-firing power plants permanently from the NSR 
program.156 That is, over a period of years, the entire process unit 
could be gradually replaced.157 In contrast, the EPA argues that the 
Final Rule effectively removes the disincentives to performing rou-
tine maintenance at older facilities, thereby increasing efficiency, 
safety, reliability, and environmental performance.158  
 Certainly, the RMRR exemption serves a necessary purpose, as it 
would be plainly unreasonable for a facility to report every minor re-
pair or replacement.159 However, in order to promote regulatory cer-
tainty and efficiency, critics argued and the EPA agreed that proper 
differentiation between a major modification and routine mainte-
nance required a bright-line test, most likely in the form of a finan-
cial threshold.160 Therefore, the EPA solicited comments from the in-
dustry, environmentalists, and its own officials to ascertain the per-
centage of the total value of a process unit which could be spent on 
routine maintenance without crossing the hypothetical threshold into 
major modifications.161 Of course, the percentages varied.162 Many 
commentators suggested that a fifty percent replacement threshold 
                                                                                                                      
 153. See generally U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CLEAN AIR ACT: NEW SOURCE 
REVIEW REVISIONS COULD AFFECT UTILITY ENFORCEMENT CASES AND PUBLIC ACCESS TO 
EMISSIONS DATA (Oct. 2003) [hereinafter OCTOBER 2003 GAO REPORT]. 
 154. Final Rule, supra note 9, at 61,264. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Barcott, supra note 8 (citing Frank O’Donnell, executive director of the nonprofit 
Clean Air Trust, who said that “[i]t’s such a huge loophole that only a moron would trip 
over it and become subject to N.S.R. requirements”). 
 157. Final Rule, supra note 9, at 61,254. 
 158. Id. at 61,251. Of course, the coal-fired power industry agrees. Katharine Q. 
Seelye, Administration Adopts Rule on Antipollution Exemption, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 
2003, at A20 (citing Thomas R. Kuhn of the Edison Electric Institute).  
 159. See WEPCO, 893 F.2d 901, 905 (7th Cir. 1990). 
 160. Final Rule, supra note 9, at 61,255-56. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. at 61,256. 
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would permit the flexibility intended by Congress under the CAA.163 
In contrast, following an inquiry ordered by EPA Assistant Adminis-
trator Jeffrey Holmstead to suggest a threshold value, Sylvia 
Lowrance, the EPA’s Deputy Assistant Administrator of Enforce-
ment, and her office analyzed the appropriate data and arrived at a 
value of 0.75%.164 For example, a utility operating with a $1 billion 
process unit would be allowed to spend $7.5 million per year on rou-
tine maintenance.165 
 However, after considering various suggestions, the EPA believed 
a twenty percent threshold would be appropriate based on two fac-
tors: (1) conformity with the Seventh Circuit’s decision in WEPCO, 
and (2) data supplied by the utility industry.166 First, the EPA be-
lieved the threshold to be consistent with the decision in WEPCO.167 
In support of this assertion, the EPA compared both the actual costs 
of the Wisconsin Electric projects and the costs cited by the Seventh 
Circuit to the total cost of Wisconsin Electric’s process units in order 
to arrive at a metric—a judicially supported, unacceptable threshold 
that may be compared to other projects.168 Accordingly, using the ac-
tual cost of the Wisconsin Electric projects,169 this “unacceptable” 
threshold amounted to twenty-nine percent. Using the cost cited by 
the Seventh Circuit, the “unacceptable” threshold amounted to 
twenty-two percent.170 As such, the EPA claimed that, as the twenty 
percent threshold falls below these judicially impermissible values, 
the promulgated threshold conformed to the WEPCO decision.171 
 Second, the EPA asserted that data compiled by the utility indus-
try; case studies of other industrial sectors, including pulp and paper 
mills, chemical manufacturers, and petroleum refineries; and general 
economic theory supported the twenty percent threshold.172 Without 
providing specific data and admitting that this data derived from a 
“limited inquiry,” the EPA claimed that “most typical replacement 
activities” would not cross the twenty percent threshold.173 
 In asserting that the promulgated threshold conformed to the 
WEPCO decision, the EPA disregarded the emphatic nature in which 
the Seventh Circuit rejected Wisconsin Electric’s life-extension pro-
                                                                                                                      
 163. Id. 
 164. Barcott, supra note 8. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Final Rule, supra note 9, at 61,256. 
 167. Id.  
 168. Id.  
 169. The actual costs of the WEPCO construction projects were greater than the costs 
considered by the Seventh Circuit in its decision. 
 170. Final Rule, supra note 9, at 61,256.  
 171. Id.  
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. at 61,257. 
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ject.174 Repeatedly, the Seventh Circuit recognized Wisconsin Elec-
tric’s life-extension project as “far from being routine,” “unprece-
dented,” and “highly unusual,” and cited the EPA’s claim that not a 
single electric utility renovation project “approached [Wisconsin Elec-
tric’s] life-extension project in nature, scope or extent.”175 Most cer-
tainly, a reading of the WEPCO decision did not create the impres-
sion that Wisconsin Electric’s life-extension project nearly satisfied or 
just barely surpassed the court’s concept of what constituted routine 
maintenance. Rather, the court supported the contention that the 
subject project’s aim was to “completely rehabilitate” an aging util-
ity.176 Furthermore, although the EPA contended that its promul-
gated threshold conforms to the twenty-two and twenty-nine percent 
replacement percentages rejected in WEPCO, the Seventh Circuit, 
although not expressly basing its decision on a cost threshold, only 
considered the cost associated with the EPA’s twenty-two percent re-
placement value.177 
 Therefore, if applying the metric the EPA utilized to validate the 
twenty percent threshold, the Seventh Circuit’s emphatic invalida-
tion of a twenty-two percent replacement value hardly seems to con-
form to the EPA’s acceptable value of twenty percent. Using this 
metric, if Wisconsin Electric reduced the scope of its life-extension 
project by less than nine percent, or $6.3 million, the project so em-
phatically rejected by the Seventh Circuit would satisfy the recently 
promulgated threshold. 
 As to the second line of evidence used to support the twenty per-
cent threshold, the EPA relied on data from four industries believed 
to be most affected by the NSR program.178 In its defense, the EPA 
lacked its own comprehensive data necessary to evaluate the effects 
of the Final Rule because the CAA does not require the EPA to col-
lect information regarding the costs and benefits of the NSR pro-
gram.179 Nonetheless, selective data submitted by industry companies 
surely painted a one-sided picture of the costs and benefits of the 
NSR program. Accordingly, the General Accounting Office (GAO) 
classified the data—suggesting that the NSR program deters energy 
efficiency projects through delays in the permitting system and high 
                                                                                                                      
 174. See generally  WEPCO, 893 F.2d 901 (7th Cir. 1990). 
 175. Id. at 911 (quoting Brief for the Respondent). 
 176. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Clay Memorandum). 
 177. The twenty-nine percent replacement value derived from the actual cost of $87.5 
million; however, the Seventh Circuit based its decision in WEPCO on a cost of $70.5 mil-
lion, not $87.5 million. Final Rule, supra note 9, at 61,256. 
 178. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CLEAN AIR ACT: EPA SHOULD USE AVAILABLE 
DATA TO MONITOR THE EFFECTS OF ITS REVISIONS TO THE NEW SOURCE REVIEW PROGRAM 
16 (Aug. 2003) [hereinafter AUGUST 2003 GAO REPORT]. 
 179. Id. at 11. 
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technology costs—as “anecdotal,”180 an observation which the EPA it-
self admitted.181 The GAO noted that statistically valid samples or an 
industry-wide survey would have been more appropriate.182 In clos-
ing, the GAO concluded that the EPA’s determination that the Final 
Rule would create economic and environmental benefits was an “un-
certain” consequence of its enactment.  
2.  Existing Enforcement Actions 
 As previously noted, during the late 1990s the EPA began an ag-
gressive campaign seeking to enforce the provisions of the NSR.183 Of 
primary interest, the Department of Justice (DOJ) filed enforcement 
actions against seven of the largest operators of coal-fired power 
plants in the country, targeting thirty-two facilities in ten states.184 
Generally, the lawsuits concerned life-extension projects which had 
not received NSR permits, or for that matter, RMRR applicability de-
terminations from the EPA.185 As many of these actions remained ac-
tive when the December 2002 proposed rule was published, the DOJ 
and state attorneys general involved expressed concern that the pro-
posed rule would affect the course of their cases.186 In short, the 
prosecutors argued that, although the proposed rule and the subse-
quent Final Rule could not be retroactively applied,187 defendant 
utilities may delay settlement proceedings, or judicial remedies may 
be affected.188 
 Interestingly, the October 2003 GAO Report agreed with the 
prosecutors’ argument, citing that typically the EPA settles ninety to 
ninety-five percent of its cases prior to trial.189 However, under these 
circumstances, settlement proceedings were developing more delib-
erately than normal.190 More to the point, the October 2003 GAO Re-
port cited an example of a utility attorney asking EPA officials what 
reasons the utility had for conforming to a rule the EPA itself was at-
                                                                                                                      
 180. Id. at 16. 
 181. U.S. EPA, supra note 133, at 26; AUGUST 2003 GAO REPORT, supra note 178, at 
23. 
 182. AUGUST 2003 GAO REPORT, supra note 178, at 23. 
 183. See supra note 132. 
 184. These seven utilities are American Electric Power, Cinergy, FirstEnergy (Ohio 
Edison), Illinois Power, Southern Company, Southern Indiana Gas & Electric, and Tampa 
Electric. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, U.S. Sues Electric Utilities in Unprecedented 
Action to Enforce the Clean Air Act (Nov. 3, 1999), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/ 
pr/1999/November/524enr.htm; see also OCTOBER 2003 GAO REPORT, supra note 153, at 2. 
 185. OCTOBER 2003 GAO REPORT, supra note 153, at 2-3. 
 186. Id. at 4. 
 187. See supra note 154 and accompanying text. 
 188. OCTOBER 2003 GAO REPORT, supra note 153, at 5. 
 189. Id. at 18. 
 190. Id.  
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tempting to reform.191 Additionally, in one of the NSR actions, a util-
ity attorney recommended a delay to the court as the EPA was recon-
sidering its interpretation of the NSR.192 Perhaps most disturbing, at 
least to prosecutors at the DOJ and the interested state attorneys 
general, was EPA Administrator Christie Whitman’s declaration dur-
ing her testimony before the Senate Committee on Government Af-
fairs in March 2002 that “[i]f [she] were a plaintiff’s attorney . . . 
[she] would not settle anything until [she] knew what happened.”193  
 In support of the GAO’s contention, following publication of the 
proposed rule in December 2002, settlement agreement activity in-
creased as several utilities entered into consent decrees with the 
EPA and DOJ.194 Unfortunately, following publication of the Final 
Rule, the EPA decided to drop investigations of fifty power plants 
around the country due to the Final Rule’s extension of the RMRR 
exemption.195 
V.  INVALIDATION OF THE ERP USING THE CHEVRON TWO-STEP 
A.  Judicial Deference to an Agency Interpretation: The Chevron 
Decision 
 Without a doubt, Chevron constitutes the seminal federal decision 
in regard to judicial deference vis-à-vis administrative interpretation 
of statutory law.196 The decision, ironic in the sense that it also in-
volved an EPA interpretation of the CAA, articulated a two-step 
process, known as the Chevron two-step, to determine the level of 
deference to be afforded an administrative interpretation. The deci-
sion also spawned what has been referred to as, perhaps incorrectly 
so, Chevron deference—which is great deference to an agency’s inter-
pretation of a congressional statute. As will be discussed, great def-
erence is only afforded at the second step, and much of the power 
remains in the hands of the reviewing court at the first step.  
                                                                                                                      
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Barcott, supra note 8; see also Schaeffer, supra note 8, at 20. 
 194. OCTOBER 2003 GAO REPORT, supra note 153, at 19. Following publication of the 
December 2002 proposed rule, the DOJ and the EPA reached agreements with four utili-
ties resulting in an annual reduction of 421,000 tons of sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxide. 
Id. The DOJ and the EPA reached additional agreements with two other utilities prior to 
December 2002, resulting in a net annual reduction of over 244,000 tons of sulfur dioxide 
and nitrogen oxide. Id. at 19 n.18. 
 195. Christopher Drew & Richard A. Oppel Jr., Lawyers at E.P.A. Say It Will Drop Pol-
lution Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2003, at A1. 
 196. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132 (2000); see also 
Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 839 (2001) 
(“Chevron’s two-step doctrine is as ubiquitous as if Congress had written it into the APA.”). 
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1.  The Chevron Two-Step 
 The Chevron two-step has been cited thousands of times by both 
federal and state courts in their efforts to identify the level of defer-
ence afforded an administrative interpretation of law.197 The basic 
premise is simple. First, if Congress speaks directly to the precise 
question at issue, then a court and the agency must follow the ex-
pressed and clear congressional intent.198 In other words, if the ad-
ministrative construction of a statutory provision is “contrary to clear 
congressional intent,” the judiciary must reject the agency interpre-
tation.199 Second, when Congress fails to speak directly to the ques-
tion at issue, creating ambiguity in the statute, the reviewing court 
affords deference to the agency and rejects its interpretation only if 
deemed unreasonable.200 According to such implicit delegation of au-
thority, the agency must develop policies and rules to fill in the gaps 
left by Congress.201 The judiciary’s role is to determine whether the 
agency’s regulations, addressing the congressional ambiguity of a 
specific statutory provision, constitute a “permissible construction” of 
the statute.202 
 Therefore, the determination of whether Congress specifically ad-
dresses the question at issue within a statutory provision dramati-
cally affects the standard of review imposed by the judiciary on an 
administrative regulation. If it is determined that Congress has di-
rectly spoken to the issue, a court reviews the agency interpretation 
de novo.203 On the other hand, if a court determines that the statu-
tory provision is ambiguous and therefore affords great deference 
upon the administrative interpretation, known as Chevron deference, 
the court applies the less stringent arbitrary and capricious stan-
dard.204 Certainly, if an agency regulation “represents a reasonable 
accommodation of conflicting policies that were committed to the 
agency’s care by the statute, we should not disturb it unless it ap-
pears from the statute or its legislative history that the accommoda-
tion is not one that Congress would have sanctioned.”205 As such, the 
                                                                                                                      
 197. According to Westlaw KeyCite, as of October 2005, the Chevron decision has been 
cited 179 times by the Supreme Court and 8121 times by lower federal and state courts. 
 198. “If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter . . . .” Chevron 
U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984). 
 199. Id. at 843 n.9; see also Fed. Election Comm’n v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign 
Comm., 454 U.S. 27, 32 (1981) (“[The courts] must reject administrative constructions of 
[a] statute, whether reached by adjudication or by rule-making, that are inconsistent with 
the statutory mandate or that frustrate the policy that Congress sought to implement.”). 
 200. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. 
 201. Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974). 
 202. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. 
 203. Merrill & Hickman, supra note 196, at 877. 
 204. Id. 
 205. United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 383 (1961). 
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Chevron doctrine creates an “all-or-nothing proposition,”206 as it is 
highly unlikely that a court will invalidate an administrative inter-
pretation under the arbitrary and capricious standard of review.207  
2.  Foundations of the Two-Step 
 The principles espoused by the Court in Chevron are founded on a 
determination of legislative intent.208 That is, the judiciary should 
only afford deference to an agency when administrative authority 
has been congressionally delegated.209 Therefore, the inquiry man-
dated in step one is not as simple as originally believed. Rather, that 
inquiry has been transformed, against the wishes of Justice Scalia 
and other textualists,210 to require determination of whether statu-
tory ambiguity necessarily results in an implicit delegation of author-
ity to an administrative agency.211  
 Interestingly, the Supreme Court emphasized two institutional 
considerations as appropriate policy rationale for judicial deference 
of agency interpretation: political accountability and agency exper-
tise.212 Administrative agencies, the Court stressed, retain greater 
political accountability than a federal judge and, therefore, are the 
preferred avenue of significant policy decisions.213 Moreover, Chevron 
reiterated the Court’s reluctance to inject its own judgment where 
the acting agency maintains a high level of expertise, particularly in 
complex and intricate regulatory arenas.214  
 The Court’s discussion of these two institutional considerations 
weakens the belief that step one of the Chevron analysis is a simple 
question of how “clearly” Congress addressed a particular issue. Ef-
fectively, the Court’s acceptance and heavy reliance upon these two 
                                                                                                                      
 206. Merrill & Hickman, supra note 196, at 855. 
 207. In fact, a review of Supreme Court decisions evidences only two instances in 
which the Court has rejected an administrative interpretation at Chevron’s step two: 
AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Bd., 525 U.S. 366 (1999), and Whitman v. American Trucking 
Assoc., 531 U.S. 457 (2001). 
 208. Dunn v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 519 U.S. 465, 479 n.14 (1997); 
Merrill & Hickman, supra note 196, at 870. 
 209. Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638, 649 (1990); Merrill & Hickman, supra 
note 196, at 870. 
 210. Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 
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 211. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984); Cass R. 
Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2090 (1990) 
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 212. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865. 
 213. Id. at 865. Indeed, legal scholars have advanced the political accountability dia-
logue even further claiming that executive branch agencies should be afforded more defer-
ence than so-called independent agencies due to greater political accountability. Elana Ka-
gan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2376-77 (2001). 
 214. Lyng v. Payne, 476 U.S. 926, 939 (1986). 
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institutional considerations creates either an expansion of the 
Court’s examination of congressional clarity215 or a semi-independent 
third step positioned between those articulated in Chevron. That is, 
first evaluate how clearly Congress addressed the precise question at 
issue. If the statutory language is reasonably ambiguous, examine 
these institutional considerations to determine if Congress would 
have desired agency decisions to carry the force of law. If not, then, 
defer to the agency and apply the arbitrary and capricious standard. 
These three steps appear mutually exclusive unless the consideration 
of institutional characteristics is shoe-horned into an evaluation of 
step-one clarity. Seemingly, this is exactly what the judiciary has 
done: a determination of congressional clarity involves the evaluation 
of these institutional considerations. In Chevron, this worked to the 
agency’s advantage as the Court decided that the CAA was ambigu-
ous and the EPA’s political accountability and expertise favored 
great deference to its interpretations. However, what if the case in-
volved an independent agency that was not under the direction of the 
executive branch, thus lacking substantial political accountability? 
Or, a severely understaffed agency lacking significant expertise in 
the field? In such situations, these additional institutional considera-
tions may enable a court to substitute its own judgment rather than 
grant deference to the agency’s interpretation.216 
 However, perhaps political accountability and agency expertise 
are not the only considerations that a reviewing court should exam-
ine when establishing how clearly Congress has spoken.217 As dis-
cussed below, FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. constitutes 
a more recent example of the Court’s indecisiveness vis-à-vis applica-
tion of the Chevron two-step. The opinion relies heavily on a then-
Judge Breyer article which espouses an “important legal question” 
rationale in ruling against the FDA.218 However, Breyer’s article also 
articulates additional considerations a court may evaluate to deter-
mine step-one clarity. Included in these additional considerations are 
whether the question involves agency administration, common law, 
or constitutional law and the trustworthiness of the agency.219 
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B.  Retreat from Chevron’s Strong Deference 
 Although the Chevron analysis maintains a fair number of sup-
porters,220 many commentators have expressed a variety of concerns, 
including the prudence of such a grant of authority to an agency,221 
the conflict with the nondelegation doctrine,222 the administrative 
theory underlying the decision,223 and the judiciary’s sporadic appli-
cation of Chevron’s principles.224 Arguably, the Court has retreated 
from the strong deferential posture espoused by Chevron through a 
willingness to halt the Chevron analysis at the first step and through 
the articulation in United States v. Mead of a divergent deference 
doctrine applicable to nonlegislative rules issued by an agency.225 
However, as discussed in subsequent parts of this Note, it is the 
Court’s willingness in step one of the Chevron analysis to find con-
gressional verbiage addressing the precise question at issue and its 
increasing reluctance to conduct the “reasonableness” evaluation in 
step two that drives the thesis of this Note. 
 Once determined that an administrative interpretation should be 
subject to the Chevron two-step, the question becomes: How clear 
must Congress be? A reviewing court will likely have some unspoken, 
nebulous standard of clarity somewhere between expressed intent 
and unqualified ambiguity.226 A lower standard of clarity would cre-
ate a decreased presumption of deference. A lower standard of clarity 
might also enable the reviewing court to look outside the expressed 
intent to underlying policy rationales and considerations when de-
termining how clear Congress was or how clear Congress should 
                                                                                                                      
 220. 1 KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 
112-14 (3d ed. 1994) (“The Chevron Court’s reconceptualization of the process of statutory 
construction is an enormous improvement over the inconsistent and wooden characteriza-
tions of the process that dominated judicial decisionmaking in the pre-Chevron era.”). 
 221. Sunstein, supra note 211, at 2074-75 (noting the language of Marbury v. Madison, 
which suggested that only judges may interpret laws). 
 222. Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Ad-
ministrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 487-88 (1989) (suggesting that the ability of 
agencies to make policy and define allegedly ambiguous legislative directives “is funda-
mentally incongruous with the constitutional course by which the Court came to reconcile 
agencies and separation of powers”). 
 223. Mark Seidenfeld, A Syncopated Chevron: Emphasizing Reasoned Decisionmaking 
in Reviewing Agency Interpretations of Statutes, 73 TEX. L. REV. 83, 86 (1994). 
 224. Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969, 
993 (1992) (“[T]he Court’s persistent refusal to abide by the narrow strictures of Chevron 
suggests that there must be something wrong with either Chevron’s implicit theory of def-
erence, or its practical implications, or both.”). 
 225. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001). To determine the level of per-
suasion of an administrative interpretation, the Court applies the multifactor approach es-
poused in Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944). Mead, 533 U.S. at 228; see also 
Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576 (2000); Robert A. Anthony & Michael Asimow, 
The Court’s Deferences—A Foolish Inconsistency, ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS, Fall 2000, at 10. 
 226. See Note, supra note 215, at 1691-92. 
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have been.227 As previously noted, in Chevron itself the Court consid-
ered political accountability and agency expertise in determining its 
standard of clarity. 
 An example of the Court’s willingness to incorporate additional 
considerations into its determination of a standard of clarity is the 
recent decision FDA v. Brown & Williamson, in which the Court re-
jected the FDA’s contention that the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act 
permitted it to regulate cigarettes as a device used to deliver drugs.228 
In an opinion authored by Justice O’Connor, the Court reiterated 
that, regardless of the nature of the issue which the agency seeks to 
address, that agency’s action must conform to the administrative 
structure created by Congress.229 Accordingly, employing the Chevron 
two-step, the Court stated that it “should not confine itself to exam-
ining a particular statutory provision in isolation.”230 Rather, the re-
viewing court should evaluate the statute holistically, as a “symmet-
rical and coherent regulatory scheme.”231  
 In addition to instructing a reviewing court to examine the en-
tirety of the statutory scheme, Brown & Williamson further aug-
ments the types of evidence available to determine if Congress has 
clearly delegated authority by mandating the use of “common sense” 
when construing a statute.232 Specifically, if an issue is of great eco-
nomic and political magnitude, the Court expects that Congress itself 
would address the issue rather than implicitly delegate authority to 
an administrative agency.233 Drawing upon then-Judge Breyer’s 
work, the Court noted, “Congress is more likely to have focused upon, 
and answered, major questions, while leaving interstitial matters to 
answer themselves in the course of the statute’s daily administra-
tion.”234 Accordingly, applying its reasoning in MCI Telecommunica-
tions Corp. v. AT&T,235 the Court concluded that regulation of to-
bacco products constituted such a significant economic and political 
decision that Congress would not have cryptically delegated author-
ity to an administrative agency.236 
                                                                                                                      
 227. Certainly, some judges may be more active while some more deferential. For a cri-
tique of both approaches, see Seidenfeld, supra note 223, at 103-24. 
 228. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 125-26 (2000). 
 229. Id. at 125 (citing ETSI Pipeline Project v. Missouri, 484 U.S. 495, 517 (1988)). 
 230. Id. at 132. 
 231. Id. at 133 (citing Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 569 (1995)). 
 232. Id. 
 233. Id.  
 234. Id. (quoting Breyer, supra note 219, at 370). 
 235. 512 U.S. 218 (1994) (rejecting the Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC) 
assertion that the Communications Act of 1934 authorized the FCC to rate-regulate an en-
tire industry). 
 236. Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 160. 
290  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:259 
 
 
 In effect, Brown & Williamson enhances a reviewing court’s abil-
ity to reach a “clarity” ruling at step one of the Chevron analysis by 
enabling or reestablishing237 review of the greater, holistic statutory 
mechanism and examining the nature of the administrative agency’s 
interpretation or action. Certainly, this more stringent analysis 
serves to lower the standard of clarity, thereby weakening the pre-
sumption of deference believed to be espoused by Chevron.238  
 Nevertheless, it should be noted that, as with Chevron, Brown & 
Williamson has its critics,239 many of whom point to the five to four 
decision as less than resounding support for its holding.240 
C.  EPA Lacks the Authority to Promulgate the ERP 
 For the purposes of this Note, it is assumed, and perhaps safely 
so,241 that a reviewing court would validate the ERP if it reaches step 
two of the Chevron analysis.242 Furthermore, Congress made it abun-
dantly clear that authority to promulgate rules and adjudicate indi-
vidual issues under the CAA rests with the EPA.243 The question here 
is whether the EPA’s interpretation of its statutory mandate, that is, 
the ERP, frustrates the expressed desire of Congress. If so, what 
                                                                                                                      
 237. This concept is far from new. See, e.g., Davis v. Mich. Dep’t of Treasury, 489 U.S. 
803 (1989); United States v. Morton, 467 U.S. 822 (1984); Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527 
(1980). However, the Chevron two-step’s focus on clarity of a particular provision perhaps 
overshadowed this canon of statutory construction. 
 238. See Note, supra note 215, at 1706. 
 239. See generally Michael P. Healy, Spurious Interpretation Redux: Mead and the 
Shrinking Domain of Statutory Ambiguity, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 673 (2002).  
 240. Merrill & Hickman, supra note 196, at 843. 
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congressional delegation, from a sheer statistical standpoint, step two of the Chevron 
analysis is not an overly fertile place to accomplish that objective. See supra note 207. 
 242. Although this Note focuses on truncating the Chevron analysis at step one due to 
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reviewing court would find the ERP an unreasonable interpretation of the CAA. For in-
stance, Iowa Utilities Board involved a challenge to rules enacted by the FCC pursuant to 
the Telecommunications Act of 1996. AT&T v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366 (1999). The 
Act demanded that incumbent service providers make a minimum number of network ele-
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that Congress expected the FCC to follow in implementing this unbundling directive. Id. at 
388. Specifically, the Act demanded that only those network elements considered necessary 
to the incoming carrier were required, such that failure to provide these elements would 
impair the incoming carrier’s ability to provide services. Accordingly, the FCC promulgated 
Rule 319, which mandated that existing service providers make seven particular network 
elements available to new carriers. Id. The Court found the FTC’s interpretation of the 
statutory criteria irrational, enabling the Court to hold Rule 319 unreasonable.  
  Certainly, an argument exists that the EPA has misinterpreted the modification rule. 
This misinterpretation may influence a reviewing court to find the ERP unreasonable. 
Therefore, invalidation at step two is certainly not precluded by the Court’s previous deci-
sions. 
 243. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7413, 7607(d) (2000). 
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tools could a reviewing court use to increase the clarity with which 
the CAA speaks and restrict the deference granted to the EPA? 
1.  The ERP Frustrates Legislative Intent 
 As discussed in Part II.B, to avoid dampening economic growth 
and stability, Congress crafted the CAA to exempt existing facilities 
from the NSPS and NSR programs until a point in time when instal-
lation of pollution-control technology became more efficient and cost 
effective.244 As such, by including the modification rule, Congress at-
tempted to designate a trigger for compliance with the NSPS and 
NSR programs.245 It is at this point that Congress’s role in defining 
modification ends and the EPA’s role begins. However, Congress un-
deniably desired that existing facilities eventually become subject to 
the NSR program.246 
 Certainly, the RMRR exemption does not conflict with the clear 
and unambiguous language of the CAA. Congress could not possibly 
have intended for minor maintenance activities to force utilities into 
submitting their facilities to the NSPS or NSR permitting process.247 
However, Congress failed to directly address how the EPA was to 
identify routine maintenance activities. Insofar as the RMRR exemp-
tion seeks to clarify the distinction between routine maintenance and 
a modification, it merely fills the statutory gap implicitly delegated 
to the EPA by Congress and is, therefore, harmonious with the con-
gressional intent of the CAA. The RMRR exemption unquestionably 
attempts to further the desires of Congress by specifying when exist-
ing coal-fired electric power plants would be exempt from EPA re-
view and, consequently, when these plants would be regulated.  
 Similarly, at least on its face, the ERP falls under the same im-
plicit legislative delegation of authority as the RMRR exemption. The 
plain language of the ERP does not conflict with the congressional in-
tent of the CAA. Rather, the ERP has the identical purpose of the 
RMRR exemption—to clarify when Congress expected facilities to be 
brought under the auspices of the NSR program. Therefore, at least 
facially, the judiciary must accept the ERP if it is deemed reasonable.  
 The plain language of the ERP reasonably promotes Congress’s 
desire to temporarily exempt existing facilities from the NSR pro-
gram. However, that is not its effect. The ERP will likely enable utili-
ties to completely rebuild a process unit within a five-year period 
while avoiding the stringent pollution-control requirements of the 
                                                                                                                      
 244. S. REP. NO. 91-1196 (1970), reprinted in ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, 
LEGAL COMPILATION: STATUTES AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY (Jan. 1975). 
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NSR program.248 Even the most cursory reading of the CAA renders 
this result unacceptable.  
 Furthermore, the mere proposal of the ERP caused the DOJ to 
halt many ongoing investigations and enforcement actions.249 Con-
gress incorporated a strong penalty feature into the CAA to facilitate 
something greater than a mere “command-and-control” regulatory 
scheme.250 The substantial civil penalties give the regulators a sig-
nificant tool to punish violators while creating a substantial deter-
rent aspect to the Act. While not completely emasculating the EPA 
and the DOJ’s ability to prosecute violators under the CAA, the ERP 
undoubtedly restricts it severely.251 Therefore, a likely ancillary effect 
of the ERP and the DOJ’s subsequent dropping of so many enforce-
ment investigations is a considerable decrease in the deterrent as-
pect of the CAA.  
2.  Judicial Review of the ERP 
 Clearly, the effects of the ERP frustrate the congressional intent 
of the ERP. However, how can a reviewing court invalidate the ERP? 
What tools are available? Although the Mead decision limits Chev-
ron’s applicability, Congress bestowed broad authority to the EPA to 
promulgate rules and regulations that carry the force of law. There-
fore, Mead would not apply and, invariably, judicial review of the 
ERP would demand utilization of the Chevron analysis.  
 As difficult as invalidation becomes at step two of the Chevron 
analysis, using the expanding standard of clarity under step one, two 
potential rationales for invalidating the ERP are available to a re-
viewing court and are discussed below. 
(a)  Review of the Entire Statutory Scheme 
 In Brown & Williamson, the Court reemphasized that step-one 
analysis demands a review of the entire statutory scheme, rather 
than mere evaluation of the provision at issue. It should be noted 
that the ERP constitutes the EPA’s attempt at interpreting the modi-
fication rule; therefore, it is the statutory intent of the modification 
rule which should be examined by a reviewing court. Moreover, in 
accord with Brown & Williamson, the modification rule should be 
evaluated as a single provision within the larger statutory scheme of 
the NSR program and the CAA. 
                                                                                                                      
 248. See supra Part IV.B.1. 
 249. See supra Part IV.B.2.  
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 Through the broad lens of statutory review demanded by the 
Brown & Williamson Court, the ultimate goal of the NSR program 
was undeniably the eventual modernization of pollution-control 
technology at existing power plants. To be sure, Congress recognized 
the importance of this modernization occurring when most finan-
cially opportune for the utility.  
 However, even the most superficial review of the CAA reveals that 
Congress did not intend to provide a permanent exemption for power 
plants existing prior to enactment of the CAA. Congress specifically 
used the term “modification” in defining when modernization should 
occur. Most certainly, if Congress intended to exempt existing facili-
ties or subject them to the NSR program only after complete recon-
struction of the plant, a narrower term than “modification” would 
have been used. Moreover, Congress would not have used the phrase 
“any physical change” to define modification. 
 Following a review of the entirety of the CAA, in particular the 
provisions and definitions of the modification rule, it becomes clear 
that, although Congress may not have spoken directly to the issue of 
when existing plants are subject to NSR review, it has directly ad-
dressed if existing plants are subject to NSR review. However, prodi-
gious mathematical skills are not necessary to determine that replac-
ing twenty percent of a power plant’s components every year would 
completely rebuild that plant within five years.  
(b)  Use of Additional Institutional Considerations 
 The Chevron Court discussed the use of two institutional consid-
erations—political accountability and agency expertise—in determin-
ing the standard of clarity applicable to step-one analysis. In all like-
lihood, a reviewing court using these considerations would arrive at 
the same conclusion as the Court in Chevron. That is, as an agency 
within the executive branch, the EPA is under direct control of the 
President, and it therefore carries a high degree of political account-
ability. Furthermore, the EPA maintains a solid foundation of exper-
tise in the arena of air pollution. Therefore, if a reviewing court were 
to consider these alternative considerations, a greater standard of 
clarity would likely be recognized, granting increased deference to an 
agency interpretation. 
 However, Breyer’s article articulates several additional institu-
tional considerations that a reviewing court may consider useful in 
determining a standard of clarity. Of particular note, Breyer identi-
fies the “important legal question” doctrine discussed in Brown & 
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Williamson and whether the agency can be trusted to give a balanced 
answer.252 
 The Brown & Williamson Court utilized the important legal ques-
tion doctrine to determine that Congress would not implicitly dele-
gate authority to an administrative agency when the issue involved 
significant economic and political implications. Although the eco-
nomic implications of the ERP will be great,253 implementation of the 
ERP will economically benefit utilities rather than economically bur-
den them, as was the case in Brown & Williamson. In this sense, the 
significant economic implications will positively affect the regulated 
industry, perhaps affording the agency more deference than if the 
rule were to negatively affect the regulated industry. 
 Nonetheless, if the Court was willing to evaluate the economic 
and political considerations of an administrative interpretation, then 
certainly other significant considerations, such as human health, 
may be available. Perhaps an evaluation of the detrimental effects of 
the ERP on human health would prove to be such a significant con-
sideration that the reviewing court may decrease the standard of 
clarity.254 If the Court proved unwilling to consider the human health 
effects per se, the economic implications of the human health effects, 
such as treatment costs, missed work days, etc., may shoehorn into 
the Court’s willingness to review significant economic considerations. 
 Although his view was not formally adopted by the Court, then-
Judge Breyer suggests that the reviewing court should also consider 
the ability of an administrative agency to provide a balanced answer 
to the question at issue. This Note has attempted to avoid the politi-
cal influences at play in the ERP debate. However, it is undeniable, 
and readily admitted by the Bush Administration, that environ-
mental policy shifted dramatically in the transition from Clinton to 
Bush. While the Clinton Administration made no headway in resolv-
ing the RMRR exemption debate, the EPA launched an aggressive 
campaign to enforce the NSR program on alleged violators. In con-
trast, Bush’s energy-centric view of environmental policy has at-
tracted much criticism from commentators. Most certainly, the ERP 
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constitutes one of the Bush Administration’s primary attempts to 
ease the regulatory burden on the energy industry.255 
 Therefore, if a reviewing court were inclined to further draw upon 
Breyer’s proposed institutional considerations, the administrative 
agency’s ability to provide a balanced answer to the modification rule 
provides a potential means of decreasing the standard of clarity. To 
be sure, any discussion of agency bias could be countered with a 
strong argument based upon the EPA’s and the Bush Administra-
tion’s political accountability. That is, people need to elect different 
representation if they do not like the policy. However, the argument 
against agency bias would provide another arrow in the quiver for a 
challenger. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 As articulated by Judge Sargus, throughout the thirty-five-year 
history of the CAA, the EPA has struggled to define when existing 
facilities should be subjected to the rigors of the NSR program.256 Un-
fortunately, the ERP provides yet another means for aging, coal-fired 
facilities to avoid the NSR program. Although facially neutral and 
arguably a reasonable means of administrating the statutorily-
crafted modification rule, the effects of the ERP frustrate the con-
gressional intent of the CAA in two respects. First, the ERP provides 
aging, coal-fired facilities the ability to completely rebuild a process 
unit within a five-year period without updated emissions abatement 
technology. Second, the ERP has shackled the EPA’s ability to en-
force past NSR violations, leading the agency to discontinue the in-
vestigation of many alleged violators. Moreover, the controversies 
that provided the impetus for the ERP—complex and inefficient 
agency and judicial review exemplified by the WEPCO decision and 
its progeny—will not be avoided. New suits will arise challenging the 
substance and language of the ERP. 
 Undoubtedly, the EPA’s authority to promulgate a rule such as 
the ERP will be determined by a reviewing court applying the Chev-
ron two-step. However, notwithstanding traditional notions of ex-
treme deference believed to be inalienably associated with the Chev-
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ron two-step, jurisprudence regarding the deference granted an ad-
ministrative agency has mutated, potentially creating alternative 
avenues for a reviewing court to invalidate an administrative regula-
tion at step one. The Court’s reemphasis on a holistic evaluation of a 
statutory scheme and utilization of the “important legal question” 
doctrine may signify its acceptance of such alternative avenues. 
